Words, deeds, and lies: Strategic behaviour in games with multiple signals

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 669-688

  Duffy, John ^a   Feltovich, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33745850421     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00391.x     Document Type: Article

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