Cheap-talk coordination of entry by privately informed firms

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 377-393

  Park, In Uck ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036762207     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087463     Document Type: Article

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