Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 104-131

  Gerardi, Dino ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Communication equilibrium; Correlated equilibrium; Revelation principle; Sequential equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347662287     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00124-8     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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