Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Volumn 23, Issue , 2004, Pages 1-10

  Lepinski, Matt ^a   Micali, Silvio ^a   Peikert, Chris ^a   Shelat, Abhi ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Correlated Equilibrium; Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Secure Function Evaluation

Indexed keywords

CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM; MECHANISM DESIGN; SECURE FUNCTION EVALUATION;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CORRELATION METHODS; FUNCTION EVALUATION; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 10444265884     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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