Designing networks with good equilibria

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 854-863

  Chen, Ho Lin ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b   Valiant, Gregory ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

END USERS; EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR; LIQUID+LIQUID EQUILIBRIA (LLE); LOWER BOUNDS; MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM (NE); NETWORK COSTS; NETWORK GAMES; TECHNICAL TOOLS;

CONTROL THEORY; COST EFFECTIVENESS; GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

COSTS;

EID: 58449133690     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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