Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 72-81

  Chekuri, Chandra ^a   Chuzhoy, Julia ^b   Lewin Eytan, Liane ^c   Naor, Joseph ^c,d   Orda, Ariel ^c  

^a LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^d MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Multicast game; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Price of stability

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COSTS; DECISION MAKING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

MULTICAST GAME; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF STABILITY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33748702050     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134716     Document Type: Conference Paper

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