Epistemic properties of knowledge hierarchies

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 185-205

  Billot, Antoine ^a,b   Walliser, Bernard ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PANTHÉON ASSAS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

^c Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee Ecole Polytechnique   (France)

Author keywords

Epistemic properties; Knowledge hierarchies; Kripke Structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001740465     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00040-8     Document Type: Article

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