How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 289-293

  Slinko, Arkadi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Coalitional manipulability; Impartial culture; Scoring rule

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542402065     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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