Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 36-68

  Gershkov, Alex ^a   Szentes, Balázs ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Information aggregation; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349108624     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004     Document Type: Article

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