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Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 436-459

Information acquisition in committees

(2) Gerardi, Dino a Yariv, Leeat b

a YALE UNIVERSITY (United States)

b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (United States)

Author keywords

Collective choice; Information acquisition; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149118022 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: 10902473 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.007 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (84)

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