Would rational voters acquire costly information?

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 129, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 225-251

  Martinelli, César ^a  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

Information acquisition; Rational ignorance; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744988618     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.005     Document Type: Article

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