Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations-The anonymous case

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 385-406

  Smorodinsky, Rann ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Equilibrium; Information acquisition; Multi party computations; Revelation principle; Sequential mechanisms

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645945276     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.001     Document Type: Article

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