Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 781-803

  Ábrahám, Árpád ^a   Pavoni, Nicola ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Ex post verification; First order approach; Hidden savings; Moral hazard; Recursive contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 52149115394     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2008.05.001     Document Type: Article

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