Optimal taxation with endogenous insurance markets

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 122, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 487-534

  Golosov, Mikhail ^a   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249857699     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.122.2.487     Document Type: Article

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