Moral hazard contracting and private credit markets

Econometrica

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 701-746

  Park, In Uck ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Endogenous adverse selection; Moral hazard; Wealth effect

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PRODUCTION CONTROL; RISK MANAGEMENT;

ENDOGENOUS ADVERSE SELECTION; INTERIM PREFERENCE; MORAL HAZARDS; WEALTH EFFECTS;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 2642522076     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00510.x     Document Type: Article

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