Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: Recursive Approaches

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 431-461

  Chang, Roberto ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009095893     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2395     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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