Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy

Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 277-304

  Bisin, Alberto ^a   Rampini, Adriano A ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy; Non exclusive contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 18144424449     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0604-y     Document Type: Article

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