Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 241-269

  Bizer, David S ^a   Demarzo, Peter M ^b  

^a LEHMAN BROTHERS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344970395     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1999.0275     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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