Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 98, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 114-126

  Cole, Harold L ^a,b   Kocherlakota, Narayana ^a,c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008339940     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2695     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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4. H. Cole, and, N. Kocherlakota, Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage, manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1998.
5. A. Fernandes, and, C. Phelan, A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence, manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1998.
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7. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Game Theory. 1991;MIT Press, Cambridge.
8. Green E., Porter R. Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica. 52:1984;87-100.
9. Spear S., Srivastava S. Repeated moral hazard with discounting. Rev. Econ. Stud. 54:1987;599-617.