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Volumn 61, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 2975-3007

When financial institutions are large shareholders: The role of macro corporate governance environments

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EID: 33846206938     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01009.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (148)

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