What do shareholders' coalitions really want? Evidence from Italian voting trusts

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 122-132

  Gianfrate, Gianfranco ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Board rights; Entrenchment effects; Multiple large shareholders; Shareholders' agreements; Voting trusts

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947258432     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00549.x     Document Type: Article

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