Understanding and managing behavioural risks: The case of malpractice in poultry production

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 27-60

  Hirschauer, Norbert ^a   Zwoll, Stefan ^b  

^a MARTIN LUTHER UNIVERSITY HALLE WITTENBERG   (Germany)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Behavioural economic analysis; Control theories; Economic misconduct; Moral hazard; Protective factors

Indexed keywords

EID: 45849124951     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-008-9051-0     Document Type: Review

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