A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers

Food Policy

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 246-265

  Hirschauer, Norbert ^a   Musshoff, Oliver ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Behavioral food risks; Contract design; Moral hazard; Sample inspection; Traceability

Indexed keywords

CROP PRODUCTION; CROPPING PRACTICE; FARMERS ATTITUDE; FOOD PRODUCTION; INCENTIVE; MORALITY; PROFITABILITY;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EURASIA; EUROPE; GERMANY;

EID: 33846323700     PISSN: 03069192     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2006.07.001     Document Type: Article

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