Modeling knowledge in economic analysis

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 367-403

  Samuelson, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544282565     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/0022051041409057     Document Type: Review

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