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International Journal of Game Theory
Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 385-408
Approximate common knowledge revisited
Author keywords

Agreeing to disagree; Common knowledge
Indexed keywords

EID: 0033409262     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050116     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (20)
References (16)
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  • 5
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    • Common knowledge
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    • Geanakoplos J (1994) Common knowledge. In: Aumann R, Hart S (eds.) Handbook of game theory, Volume 2, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, Chapter 40
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    • Geanakoplos, J.1
  • 6
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    • Kajii A, Morris S (1997) The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. Econometrica 65:1283-1309
    • (1997) Econometrica , vol.65 , pp. 1283-1309
    • Kajii, A.1    Morris, S.2
  • 7
    • 0004316544 scopus 로고
    • Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
    • Lewis D (1969) Conventions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
    • (1969) Conventions
    • Lewis, D.1
  • 8
    • 0001619801 scopus 로고
    • Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
    • Monderer D, Samet D (1989) Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior 1:170-190
    • (1989) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.1 , pp. 170-190
    • Monderer, D.1    Samet, D.2
  • 9
    • 0030204527 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Proximity of information in games with incomplete information
    • Monderer D, Samet D (1996) Proximity of information in games with incomplete information. Mathematics of Operations Research 21:707-725
    • (1996) Mathematics of Operations Research , vol.21 , pp. 707-725
    • Monderer, D.1    Samet, D.2
  • 11
    • 0001056648 scopus 로고
    • P-dominance and belief potential
    • Morris S, Rob R, Shin H (1995) p-dominance and belief potential. Econometrica 63:145-147
    • (1995) Econometrica , vol.63 , pp. 145-147
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  • 12
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    • Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common p-beliefs
    • Neeman Z (1996a) Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common p-beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior 12:162-164
    • (1996) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.12 , pp. 162-164
    • Neeman, Z.1
  • 13
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    • Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
    • Neeman Z (1996b) Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade. Games and Economic Behavior 16:77-96
    • (1996) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.16 , pp. 77-96
    • Neeman, Z.1
  • 14
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    • The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge
    • Rubinstein A (1989) The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge. American Economic Review 79:385-391
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    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 15
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    • 'Impossibility of speculation' theorems with noisy information
    • Sonsino D (1995) 'Impossibility of speculation' theorems with noisy information. Games and Economic Behavior 8:406-423
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    • Sonsino, D.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.