Global games: Theory and applications

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume 1

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 56-114

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Shin, Hyun Song ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892642303     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.004     Document Type: Chapter

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