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Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1255-1267

Finite order implications of common priors

Author keywords

Common belief; Common knowledge; Common prior assumption; Universal belief space

Indexed keywords

FINITE AUTOMATA; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; MANY VALUED LOGICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PARAMETER ESTIMATION;

EID: 0141829826     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00446     Document Type: Note
Times cited : (27)

References (15)
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  • 5
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  • 8
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  • 9
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.