Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 77-96

  Neeman, Zvika ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030240498     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0075     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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