Coordination, communication, and common knowledge; A retrospective on the electronic-mail game

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 433-445

  Morris, Stephen ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; ECONOMIC POLICY; KNOWLEDGE;

EID: 0036983012     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/18.4.433     Document Type: Article

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