Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 35, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 6-30

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Samuelson, Larry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Coordinated attack problem; Electronic Mail Game; Evolutionarily stable strategy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013083894     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0749     Document Type: Article

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