New directions for IPE: Drawing from behavioral economics

International Studies Review

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 239-265

  Elms, Deborah Kay ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL THEORY;

EID: 43749120058     PISSN: 15219488     EISSN: 14682486     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00772.x     Document Type: Article

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