Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory to Bargaining

Political Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 213-239

  Kanner, Michael D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Framing; Negotiations; Prospect theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842842995     PISSN: 0162895X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00369.x     Document Type: Article

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