Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 655-683

  Gersbach, Hans ^a   Hahn, Volker ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41049091178     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0259-7     Document Type: Article

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