Central bank transparency

Economic Journal

Volumn 112, Issue 483, 2002, Pages

  Geraats, Petra M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; LITERATURE REVIEW; MONETARY POLICY; POLICY ANALYSIS;

EID: 0036864181     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00082     Document Type: Article

References (81)

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