Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 71-100

  Genicot, Garance ^a   Ray, Debraj ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bilateral contracting; Coordination game; Delays; Exploitation; Multilateral externalities

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750019766     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.003     Document Type: Article

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