Markets versus governments

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 159-189

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Golosov, Mikhail ^a   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Governments; Markets; Mechanisms; Political economy; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 39549101000     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.12.003     Document Type: Article

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