The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 136, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 341-378

  Segal, Ilya ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation; Combinatorial auctions; Communication complexity; Convex economies; Envy free allocations; Indivisible goods; Informational efficiency; Message space dimension; Nondeterministic communication (verification); Pareto efficiency; Price mechanisms; Social choice rules; Stability; Stable many to one matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548087551     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.011     Document Type: Article

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