Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 79, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 503-519

  Konrad, Kai A ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Commitment; H21; H23; Privacy; Time consistent income taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008849582     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00104-8     Document Type: Article

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