Promotion rules and skill acquisition: An experimental study

Economica

Volumn 74, Issue 294, 2007, Pages 259-297

  Oosterbeek, Hessel ^a   Sloof, Randolph ^a   Sonnemans, Joep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; INVESTMENT INCENTIVE; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; SKILLED LABOR; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 34147137928     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: 14680335     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00537.x     Document Type: Article

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