Worker reciprocity and employer investment in training

Economica

Volumn 72, Issue 285, 2005, Pages 137-149

  Leuven, Edwin ^a,b   Oosterbeek, Hessel ^a,b   Sloof, Randolph ^a,b   van Klaveren, Chris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE; INVESTMENT; RECIPROCITY; TRAINING; WORKING CONDITIONS;

EID: 14644389379     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00405.x     Document Type: Article

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