On the relation between asset ownership and specific investments

Economic Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 474, 2001, Pages 791-820

  Sonnemans, Joep ^a   Oosterbeek, Hessel ^a   Sloof, Randolph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; INVESTMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034799760     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00660     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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