Hiding information in electoral competition

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 48-74

  Heidhues, Paul ^a   Lagerlöf, Johan ^a  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Correlation; Electoral competition; Information transmission; Opportunism; Pandering; Public opinion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038743088     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00531-6     Document Type: Review

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