How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?

Public Choice

Volumn 132, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 471-484

  Berger, Helge ^a,b   Mueller, Till ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central bank; Currency union; ECB; Federal central bank; Optimal representation; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547806196     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9173-x     Document Type: Article

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