Transparency and credibility: Monetary policy with unobservable goals

International Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 369-397

  Faust, Jon ^a,b   Svensson, Lars E O ^a,b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD   (United States)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009903373     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00114     Document Type: Article

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