The mixed blessing of IMF intervention: Signalling versus liquidity support

Journal of Financial Stability

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 149-174

  Zwart, Sanne ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Catalytic finance; Coordination problems; Strategic signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347329346     PISSN: 15723089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2007.04.001     Document Type: Article

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