Does one soros make a difference? A theory of currency crises with large and small traders

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 87-113

  Corsetti, Giancarlo ^a   Dasgupta, Amil ^b   Morris, Stephen ^a   Shin, Hyun Song ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CURRENCY; EXCHANGE RATE; FINANCIAL CRISIS; INVESTMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0842312523     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00277     Document Type: Article

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