Rethinking multiple equilibria in macroeconomic modeling

NBER Macroeconomics Annual

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 118-161

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Shin, Hyun Song ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039973633     PISSN: 08893365     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1162/08893360052390301     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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