Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 65-85

  Metz, Christina E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

Currency crises; Multiple equilibria; Private and public information; Self fulfilling expectations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036614429     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s712-002-8221-x     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Global games and equilibrium selection in coordination games
2. Speculative attacks: Unique sunspot equilibrium and transparency
3. A model of balance-of-payment crises
4. Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks
5. Coordination risk and the price of Debt
6. Global games: Theory and applications
7. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features
8. Expectation and information in second generation currency crises models