International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality

Economic Policy

Volumn , Issue 33, 2001, Pages 407-432

  Jeanne, Olivier ^a   Zettelmeyer, Jeromin ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONDITIONALITY; FINANCIAL PROVISION; IMF; LENDING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0034770626     PISSN: 02664658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0327.00080     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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