Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy traps

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 452-484

  Angeletos, George Marios ^a,b   Hellwig, Christian ^c   Pavan, Alessandro ^d  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CURRENCY; POLICY REFORM; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 33746228096     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/504901     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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